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This Article argues that commercialisation of space coupled with
technological innovation calls for a regulatory approach beyond (and
complementary to) the treaty regime offered by international law. The
rapid technological advances in the financial sector and corresponding
regulatory innovations make financial technology (fintech) regulation a
likely candidate to draw lessons from for the nascent space sector. The
Article draws from the fintech sector and proposes that some lessons
about initial regulation via regulatory sandboxes and sandbox bridges
are useful in the space sector. At the domestic level, the Article proposes
regulatory sandboxes to enable innovation while ensuring the necessary
safeguards; and at the multi-national level, it proposes cooperation
between regulators in various spacefaring nations along the lines of
sandbox bridges used in the fintech sector. Since different states have
varying levels of space sector activity, this Article makes broad
recommendations with pointers that identify aspects that are more
suitable to certain types of jurisdictions than others.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this Article, we offer a proposal for a legal regime that is
appropriate for the era of corporations entering the space sector. We
suggest a temporary regulatory model based on voluntary cooperation
between regulators in various spacefaring nations along the lines of
regulatory sandboxes and sandbox bridges used in the financial
technology (fintech) sector.1 As a general rule, the optimal law for any
new and fast-developing technology is one that can strike the balance
between enabling innovation and ensuring adequate safeguards.2
Regulation of fintech, which responded to a relatively recent
technological innovation in the financial sector, has valuable lessons to
offer to a similarly nascent space sector.
As the cost of space activity fell and the potential commercial
applications grew, the space sector opened up to many new private
corporations.3 These factors have given rise to what has now come to be
called the “new space” sector or simply New Space.4 Recognizing that
New Space activities have enormous applications (including providing
connectivity to remote areas and earth observation imagery that can be
used in multiple industries),5 mainstream investors have entered the
1. See Saule T. Omarova, Dealing with Disruption: Emerging Approaches to Fintech
Regulation, 61 WASH U. J.L. & POL’Y 25 (2020). Although the term fintech does not have a
formal definition, in practice, it refers to various digital technologies and business models that
are disrupting the financial sector. See id. at 25.
2. See generally Rebecca Crootof & BJ Ard, Structuring Tech Law, 34 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 347 (2021).
3. Why Big Business Is Making a Giant Leap into Space, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON
(June 4, 2019), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/commercial-space-economy/.
4. Ken Davidian, Definition of NewSpace, 8 NEW SPACE 53-55 (2020),
https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/space.2020.29027.kda.
5. OECD, MEASURING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE SPACE SECTOR: KEY
INDICATORS AND OPTIONS TO IMPROVE DATA 6 (2020), https://www.oecd.org/innovation
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market. This is reflected in the continuing rise of the amount of private
investment in the commercial space sector. Even in 2020, when business
activity was affected by the Covid-19 pandemic, it was reported to be
the largest year on record for investment into space companies.6 Experts
are predicting a further increase in 2021.7 New Space also seems to be
riding the special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) boom of 2020
and 2021.8 A SPAC is a publicly traded company that can be used by a
private company to access the public market by means of a merger.9 This
way, the cost of a formal initial public offering can be avoided.10 Six
space companies (Rocket Lab, Spire, Black Sky, Astra, AST Space
Mobile, and Momentus Space) have either announced plans to take the
SPAC route to go public or have already done so.11
/inno/measuring-economic-impact-space-sector.pdf. The range of potential space
technologies include space travel, “spacecraft that deliver payloads to space for research, . . .
high-resolution Earth imaging for environmental monitoring; satellites for communications
and data sharing . . . and mining the solar system for [useful] metals.” John Cumbers, The New
Space Race: Meet The Investors Building A New Space Settlement Industry, FORBES (Feb. 18,
2020, 6.38 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johncumbers/2020/02/18/the-new-space-racemeet-the-investors-building-a-new-space-settlement-industry/?sh=6abb3d606b58. Cuttingedge satellite technology (i.e., nanosatellites or CubeSats) might be able to “put a distress
beacon in every automobile, allow remote monitoring of wildlife in any environment on earth,
and track your Amazon shipment—not just when it’s on a truck, but backward, all the way to
the factory that produced it. And it could be done at a fraction of the cost of earlier satellite
tracking systems.” See Christopher Mims, The Tiny Satellites That Will Connect Cows, Cars
and Shipping Containers to the Internet, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 9, 2021, 12:00 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-tiny-satellites-that-will-connect-cows-cars-and-shippingcontainers-to-the-internet-11610168400.
6. Michael Sheetz, Investment in space companies bounced back in the third quarter
from the COVID-19 lull, report says, CNBC (Oct. 15, 2020, 1:05 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/15/space-investing-q3-2020-report-investment-bouncesback-from-covid-19.html.
7. See Peggy Hollinger, Investors Join Space Race With Record Funding, FIN. TIMES
(Apr. 29, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/bdbe37cf-8d23-467c-89a5-abeae23de73f.
8. See Amrith Ramkumar, 2020 SPAC Boom Lifted Wall Street’s Biggest Banks, WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 5, 2021, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/2020-spac-boom-lifted-wallstreets-biggest-banks-11609842601; Mathieu Luinaud & William Ricard, The Promises and
Pitfalls of SPACs for the Space Economy, VIA SATELLITE (May 25, 2021),
http://interactive.satellitetoday.com/via/june-2021/the-promises-and-pitfalls-of-spacs-forthe-space-economy/.
9. Ramey Layne & Brenda Lenahan, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies: An
Introduction, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 6, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/07/06/special-purpose-acquisition-companies-anintroduction.
10. Id.
11. Jeff Foust, Can you still spell space without SPAC?, SPACENEWS (Mar. 23, 2021),
https://spacenews.com/can-you-still-spell-space-without-spac. However, this also means that
the SECs increased scrutiny of SPACs is something for investors in this sector to watch. See
Dave Michaels, SEC Weighs New Investor Protections for SPACs, WALL ST. J. (May 26,
2021, 4:01 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-weighs-new-investor-protections-forspacs-11622052408?mod=article_inline. Already, the SEC has accused the founder of
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The growing space economy presents some concerns. In a 2021
conference, two of the key issues identified as significant for investors
in New Space were spectrum rights and orbital debris.12 The former
refers to the increased interest in using low earth orbit (LEO) and
medium earth orbit (MEO) satellites (as against the more traditionally
used geostationary equatorial orbit (GEO) satellites) to provide
connectivity.13 Relatedly, orbital debris, also known as space junk,
refers to old spacecraft and satellites, which could cause collisions
resulting in enormous damage.14 As more satellites are launched,
particularly in the LEO where companies like SpaceX have launched
mega-constellations, the risk of collision has increased manifold.15
Thus, it is high time that we rethink the legal regime applicable to space
activities. Furthermore, the fast pace of innovation in this sector means
that the law has to play catch up to not only encourage innovation, but
also identify and address problems like orbital debris, allocation of
spectrum rights, etc. There are also broader concerns, like the
sustainability of space operations and possible militarisation of space.
While this Article will address the sustainable use of space by
corporations, space militarisation is beyond the scope of this Article16
and is only addressed incidentally.
Scholars have called for the development of an international legal
framework to specifically address the new technological developments
like space resource exploitation.17 In addition to the need for

Momentus Space of fraud, and its SPAC partner of negligence respectively, for not disclosing,
and in the case of the SPAC partner, for not finding via due diligence, issues with the
underlying technology and some other concerns. See Dave Michaels, A Space Company’s
Wall Street Launch Misfires, WALL ST. J. (July 25, 2021, 12:00 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-space-companys-wall-street-launch-misfires11627228802?mod=hp_lead_pos5.
12. 5 Key Themes in the New Space Economy, MORGAN STANLEY (Feb. 4, 2021),
https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/space-economy-themes-2021.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Clive Cookson, ‘Huge risk’ of space junk collisions as satellite launches intensify,
experts warn, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/7ded0def-1715-4d01880b-939a89cc33d7.
16. For a discussion on the militarisation of outer space, see Melissa de Zwart & Dale
Stephens, The Space (Innovation) Race: The Inevitable Relationship Between Military
Technology and Innovation, 20 MELB. J. INT’L L. 1 (2019).
17. Talking about the increasing participation of private players in the space sector,
Brennan and Vecchi had said, in their 2011 book, that “the role of states and national space
agencies is to adapt to this new social value of the efficiency of investment.” See LOUIS
BRENNAN & ALESSANDRA VECCHI, THE BUSINESS OF SPACE: THE NEXT FRONTIER OF
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 19 (2011). Scholars have also called for rules in response to
specific developments. See e.g., Fengna Xu, Jinyuan Su & Miqdad Mehdi, A Re-Examination
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international consensus on the applicable rules and standards for newer
developments, domestic space legislation also needs to be improved.
Current legislation in most countries provides a licensing framework for
launching space objects18 but does not address newer issues like space
debris, commercial human spaceflight, the use of information collected
by earth observation satellites, etc.
Further, the process of obtaining necessary licenses for space
activity may itself act as a barrier for smaller companies to enter the
sector. As Professor Lyon Brad King observes, bigger aerospace
companies of the past took around ten years to build a satellite and thus
could afford to wait for permits.19 However, smaller start-ups that are
building satellites in the space of a few months would not have enough
capital to wait for the lengthy permit process.20 Besides, the relevant
authority issuing these permits might not understand the new innovation.
For instance, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which is
the relevant authority to issue permits for satellite launches in the United
States, denied start-up Swarm Technologies a permit for launching small
satellites, called SpaceBEEs, on the basis that they were too small to be
tracked.21 Swarm Technologies decided to launch the SpaceBEEs
anyway, and later explained that they had hoped the FCC would give
them approval after their launch because the FCC had allegedly done so
for other companies in previous instances.22 It is also interesting to note
that, contrary to the FCC decision, Swarm Technologies said that the
SpaceBEES were easily trackable by the Space Surveillance Network,
as well as by LeoLabs, a California-based company.23 Eventually,
Swarm Technologies settled the matter by agreeing to a $900,000
penalty, an extended period of FCC oversight, and a requirement of prelaunch notices to the FCC.24 This story is important for two reasons.
of Fundamental Principles of International Space Law at the Dawn of Space Mining, 44 J.
SPACE L. 1 (2020).
18. See e.g., Space (Launches and Returns) Act 2018 (Cth) (Austl.).
19. Lyon Brad King, Space tech has outpaced space law, and we’re at risk of killing
innovation, TECHCRUNCH (July 11, 2018, 12:35 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/07/11/
space-tech-has-outpaced-space-law-and-were-at-risk-of-killing-innovation.
20. Id.
21. Letter from Anthony Serafini, Chief, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n Experimental
Licensing Branch, to Sara Spangelo, Chief Executive Officer, Swarm Technologies, Inc.
(Dec. 12, 2017), https://apps.fcc.gov/els/GetAtt.html?id=203152&x.
22. Marina Koren, Launching Rogue Satellites Into Space Was a ‘Mistake,’ THE
ATLANTIC (Sept. 7, 2018, 7:36 PM), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2018/09/spacebees-swarm-unauthorized-satellite-launch/569395/.
23. Id.
24. Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Reaches $900,000 Settlement with
Swarm
for
Unauthorized
Satellite
Launch
(Dec.
20,
2018),
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-355578A1.pdf.
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First, it may be the case that the FCC might have been better served by
engaging with Swarm Technologies to inform itself about whether the
satellites could be tracked. Second, the FCC seems to have taken eight
months to decide on not granting the permit (April 2017 to December
2017).25 Such a long timeline is burdensome for small start-ups. Perhaps
as a result of this experience, the FCC introduced a more flexible and
cheaper application process for licensing small satellites in 2020.26
While the more flexible licensing system for small satellites is
promising, we argue that a period of regulatory learning and
experimentation through regulatory sandboxes may be helpful for both
regulators and New Space companies. On an international level, we
argue that a regulatory approach beyond (and complementary to) the
treaty regime offered by international law is necessary to provide a
framework. The rapid technological advances in the financial sector and
corresponding regulatory innovations make fintech regulation a likely
candidate to draw lessons from for the nascent New Space sector.
The remainder of this Article will proceed as follows. Part I
critically reviews existing international law treaties and multi-national
agreements, including the more recent Artemis Accords, in order to
assess their suitability to regulate New Space. Part II discusses
regulatory sandboxes and sandbox bridges used in the fintech sector by
drawing on pertinent lessons for New Space regulation. Part III makes
the case for regulating the New Space sector through sandboxes and
sandbox bridges and Part IV assesses possible safety concerns of such
an approach. Part V is the conclusion.
II. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS REGARDING NEW
SPACE
There are five main treaties relevant to space activities.27 Some of
these are less important than others because of the limited number of
signatories. There is also a multi-lateral agreement, the Artemis
Accords, which was initiated by the United States, and some bilateral
agreements between space agencies that are pertinent to this
discussion.28 While the bilateral and multilateral agreements are more
recent and try to address New Space activities, the international treaties

25. Id. The application was made in April 2017 and the FCC denied the permit in
December 2017.
26. Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Streamlines Application Process for
Small Satellites (Aug. 1, 2019), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-358834A1.pdf.
27. See infra 1.1.
28. See infra 1.2.
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date back to the Cold War era.29 Despite how dated the international
treaties are, it is worth studying them because of the large number of
spacefaring nations that have signed some of these treaties. To a large
extent, the broad ideas and principles enshrined in those treaties are
upheld in the new space sector as will be discussed in Part II of this
Article. However, some other principles are contested in the context of
new space as this Part I discusses.
1. International treaties
The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, 1967 (Outer Space Treaty) is the main instrument
regulating activities in space.30 Significantly, all major spacefaring
nations at the time including the United States, Russia, China, the United
Kingdom, Germany, France, etc., signed the treaty.31
Even though it was signed in the Cold War era when there was no
private sector involvement in outer space, Article VI of the Outer Space
Treaty seems relevant to the present moment inasmuch as it says that a
State32 bears national responsibility for all of its activities in space,
whether carried out by governmental agencies or non-governmental
entities.33 Thus it falls upon states to supervise activities of the nongovernmental entity in order to comply with international law.34
Consequently, many states have introduced national legislation to
regulate the New Space sector.35 Around two dozen states have
introduced such laws and this includes both the big space powers of the
cold war era and newer entrants into the space sector.36 All of these
national laws provide for licensing systems amongst other things.37
29. See infra 1.1.
30. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
31. See Status of International Agreements relating to Activities in Outer Space, UNITED
NATIONS OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFF., https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/
spacelaw/treaties/status/index.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2021).
32. See id.
33. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 30, art. VI, 18 U.S.T. at 2415, 610 U.N.T.S. at
209.
34. See James J. Trimble, International Law of Outer Space and Its Effect on
Commercial Space Activity, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 521, 537-43 (1984).
35. See Frans G. von der Dunk, Billion-dollar Questions? Legal Aspects of Commercial
Space Activities, 23 UNIFORM L. REV. 418 (2018) [hereinafter Dunk, Billion-dollar Question].
36. See id.
37. See FABIO TRONCHETTI, The Legal Framework Regulating International Outer
Space Activities, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SPACE LAW AND POLICY 3-24 (2013); Dunk, Billiondollar Question, supra note 35, at 424.
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Article II of the Outer Space Treaty is also relevant to some of the
activities in the New Space sector since it forbids the national
appropriation of outer space resources.38 Although this principle is wellaccepted (with some even calling it a ground norm),39 there is debate
about its meaning and scope.40 There is an argument that Article II only
prohibits national appropriation and not private appropriation but the
contrary argument also exists.41 There are also debates about whether
the prohibition on appropriation also prohibits activities like space
mining which some countries like the United States and Luxembourg
explicitly allow.42 Some argue that since the Outer Space Treaty
anticipates “ ‘ exploration and use’ of outer space and celestial bodies”
by non-governmental actors, this must include the use of space
resources.43
Although these debates make it obvious that the Outer Space Treaty
is a creature of a different era, there have been controversies about how
the Outer Space Treaty should be interpreted even before the New Space
era. While we could assume that current disagreements over the
interpretation of the terms of this Treaty stem from different levels of
capability across States, the scholarly debate suggests that there are
genuine treaty interpretation issues as well. Further, the Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) is now working on
building an international framework on space resource activities.44 This
shows that there really is a need to establish an international consensus
on this issue afresh, and that clauses of the Outer Space Treaty alone
might not suffice. Even before CUPUOS started working on this issue,
38. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 30, art. II, 18 U.S.T. at 2413, 610 U.N.T.S. at 208.
39. See generally Zachos A. Paliouras, The Non-Appropriation Principle: The
Grundnorm of International Space Law, 27 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 37–54 (2014).
40. Melissa J. Durkee, Interstitial Space Law, 97 WASH U. L. REV. 423, 455 (2019).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 457; U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 11490, §§ 401-403, 129 Stat. 704, 720-22 (2015) (codified as amended at 51 U.S.C. 10101
(2018)); Law of July 20th 2017 on the Exploration and Use of Space Resources, LUX. SPACE
AGENCY, https://space-agency.public.lu/en/agency/legal-framework/law_space_resources_
english_translation.html (last updated Nov. 18, 2019).
43. Durkee, supra note 40, at 457.
44. The mandate of The Working Group of the COPUOS is, amongst other things, to
“[d]evelop a set of initial recommended principles for such activities taking into account the
need to ensure that they are carried out in accordance with international law and in a safe,
sustainable, rational and peaceful manner, for the consideration of and consensus agreement
by the Committee, followed by possible adoption by the United Nations General Assembly as
a dedicated resolution or other action.” See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep.
of
the
Legal
Subcomm.
on
Its
Sixty-Fourth
Session,
U.N.
Doc.
A/AC.105/2021/CRP.11/Rev.1 (2021), https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents
/2021/aac_1052021crp/aac_1052021crp_11rev_1_0_html/AC105_2021_CRP11Rev01E.pdf
.
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there had been private efforts in this direction. In November 2019, the
Hague International Space Resources Governance Working Group had
adopted the “Building Blocks for the Development of an International
Framework on Space Resource Activities,” which said that the issue
should be addressed incrementally and “at the appropriate time on the
basis of contemporary technology and practices.”45
Similar disagreements between States can be foreseen when more
permanent settlements are established on the Moon or on Mars.46
Scholars have been writing about this issue for a while now. For
example, Hertzfeld and von der Dunk have suggested that ownership of
permanent structures on celestial bodies will vest in the company or state
that builds and places the structure on the celestial body with resources
from Earth.47 On the other hand, they say it is not clear whom the
ownership rights will vest in if the structure is built on the celestial body
from “locally available resources.”48
Looking further ahead,
Gabrynowicz argues that when there are human settlements on celestial
bodies, individuals in those settlements “will take the law they know
from the place they came” and then adapt it to the local needs and
practical concerns.49 But what happens when humans from different
countries disagree on the applicable laws? These issues might again
need to be ironed out through cooperation and consensus-building when
the practical need for such laws become imminent.
The second treaty, the Rescue of Astronauts and Return of Space
Objects, 1968 (Rescue and Return Agreement)50 is an elaboration of
Articles V and VIII of the Outer Space Treaty.51 The purpose of the

45. See THE HAGUE INTERNATIONAL SPACE RESOURCES GOVERNANCE WORKING
GROUP, BUILDING BLOCKS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK
ON SPACE RESOURCE ACTIVITIES (2019), https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/
content/assets/rechtsgeleerdheid/instituut-voor-publiekrecht/lucht—en-ruimterecht/spaceresources/bb-thissrwg—cover.pdf.
46. See Kyle Evanoff, The Outer Space Treaty’s Midlife Funk, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL. (Oct. 10, 2017, 2:08 PM), https://www.cfr.org/blog/outer-space-treatys-midlife-funk.
47. Henry R. Hertzfeld & Frans G. von der Dunk, Bringing Space Law into the
Commercial World: Property Rights Without Sovereignty, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 81, 83 (2005)
(“[O]wnership of permanent structures that might be constructed on celestial bodies, including
the moon, will vest in the company or state building the structure, at least to the extent it is
place ‘on a celestial body.’ ” ).
48. Id. (“With regard to any structure essentially made from locally available resources,
there are no clear rules, and it may be valuable to establish clarity on this subject.”).
49. Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, Some Legal Considerations Regarding the Future of
Space Governance, 48 GA. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 739, 746 (2020).
50. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of
Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119
[hereinafter Rescue and Return Agreement].
51. Article V of the Outer Space Treaty provides as follows:
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Rescue and Return Agreement was to create an obligation for signatories
to assist and help astronauts experiencing situations of danger or distress
and to set out the conditions under which such help should be given.52
Although this seems to be the least discussed of the international treaties
pertaining to outer space (it has even been called a sleeping beauty for
this reason),53 the Rescue and Return Agreement is likely to be an
important instrument in the era of space travel which we seem to have
just entered. At the time of writing this Article Blue Origen, Virgin
Galactic, and SpaceX have all conducted their first space flights with
paying customers on board.54 The SpaceX flight crew did not even
include a professional astronaut on board.55
A major issue with the Rescue and Return Agreement is that
although it deals with assistance to astronauts for earth-related events,
like emergency landings, it does not address the issue of providing
assistance to astronauts in space.56 This limitation reflects the level of

States Parties to the Treaty shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer
space and shall render to them all possible assistance in the event of accident,
distress, or emergency landing on the territory of another State Party or on the high
seas. When astronauts make such a landing, they shall be safely and promptly
returned to the State of registry of their space vehicle.
In carrying on activities in outer space and on celestial bodies, the astronauts of one
State Party shall render all possible assistance to the astronauts of other States
Parties.
States Parties to the Treaty shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the
Treaty or the Secretary-General of the United Nations of any phenomena they
discover in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, which could
constitute a danger to the life or health of astronauts.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 30, art. V, 18 U.S.T. at 2414, 610 U.N.T.S. at 208-09.
52. The preamble of the Rescue and Return Agreement notes,
[T]he great importance of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, which calls for the rendering of all possible assistance to
astronauts in the event of accident, distress or emergency landing, the prompt and
safe return of astronauts, and the return of objects launched into outer space . . . .
Rescue and Return Agreement, supra note 50, pmbl., 19 U.S.T. at 7572, 672 U.N.T.S. at 12021 (footnote omitted).
53. Frans G. von der Dunk, A Sleeping Beauty Awakens: The 1968 Rescue Agreement
After Forty Years, 34 J. SPACE L. 411, 412 (2008) [hereinafter Dunk, A Sleeping Beauty
Awakens].
54. SpaceX success: Trailblazing tourist trip to orbit ends with splashdown, N.Z.
HERALD (Sept. 18, 2021, 4:58 PM), https://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/spacex-successtrailblazing-tourist-trip-to-orbit-ends-with-splashdown/
RFERLBHWRUPTSYFK6ZFQPKCVUQ/.
55. Id.
56. Mark J. Sundahl, The Duty to Rescue Space Tourists and Return Private Spacecraft,
35 J. SPACE L. 163, 167 (2009) (“Ideally, space law would impose a duty to rescue whenever
anyone aboard a spacecraft experiences distress, whether on the ground, in space, or on a
celestial body. However, …under existing space law… the space treaties were drafted in a
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technological advancement at the time the Rescue and Return
Agreement was entered into. With the advancement of space technology
and space tourism getting started, issues like the obligation to rescue and
return astronauts or spacecraft will become important.
Even as far as rescue and return on earth is concerned, the duty to
engage in search and rescue operations imposed on States can be
beneficial for the space tourism industry. Sundhal argues that the duty
“will contribute to the safety of such company’s operations and could
help the company maintain solvency in the event of an accident.”57
There will also be questions about who is covered by the Rescue and
Return Agreement. The Rescue and Return Agreement only mentions
“personnel” in the text and “astronauts” in the preamble.58 Even if these
two terms do not include tourists, it now makes logical sense to include
space tourists within the ambit of the Rescue and Return Agreement
considering that space flight is now a reality. As von der Dunk argues,
safety is a critical concern of the public, which will inevitably become
space passengers as the cost of space flight decreases.59 Thus, it will be
in the interests of states and corporations to agree to a broader
interpretation of the Rescue and Return Agreement.
Significantly, Sundahl contends that the Rescue and Return
Agreement does not exclude commercial enterprises from its ambit.60 In
fact, the term “personnel,” which is typically used in a commercial
context, is used in the Rescue and Return Agreement.61 Based on this,
perhaps it is possible to argue that states would be required to rescue
non-governmental personnel and return private spacecraft. Of the seven
manner that creates uncertainty about whether the duty to rescue under the treaties reaches
this ideal.”).
57. MARK J. SUNDAHL, BUSINESS, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES IN RELATION TO
INCREASED PRIVATE SPACE ACTIVITY 8 (2019), https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu
/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1980&context=fac_articles.
58. Dunk, A Sleeping Beauty Awakens, supra note 53, at 421-22.
59. Id. at 431-34.
60. Sundahl, supra note 57, at 178-82.
61. Id. at 178-79. The text of Article 1 of the Rescue and Return Agreement is as follows:
Each Contracting Party which receives information or discovers that the personnel
of a spacecraft have suffered accident or are experiencing conditions of distress or
have made an emergency or unintended landing in territory under its jurisdiction or
on the high seas or in any other place not under the jurisdiction of any State shall
immediately:
(a) Notify the launching authority or, if it cannot identify and immediately
communicate with the launching authority, immediately make a public
announcement by all appropriate means of communication at its disposal;
(b) Notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who should disseminate
the information without delay by all appropriate means of communication at his
disposal.
Rescue and Return Agreement, supra note 50, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. at 7573, 672 U.N.T.S. at 121.
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instances where the Rescue and Return Agreement has been put to
practical use, two instances involve private spacecraft being returned.62
Based on this, Sundahl argues that we already have evidence of states
extending the duty to return to privately-owned spacecraft.63 In the New
Space era, this would mean that states should also impose this duty on
space corporations as a part of their license requirements. It would also
be in the interest of corporations to have these duties in place so as to be
able to assure potential customers of safety mechanisms.
Ultimately, even reading space tourists into the term “personnel” in
the Treaty, and imposing obligations on private companies to provide
assistance to those in need of it will not be enough. The Rescue and
Return Treaty should also be sufficiently re-written to clearly state that
there is an obligation to provide assistance in space, rather than just after
landing on Earth.
The third treaty governing space activities is the Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 1972
(Liability Convention).64 This Convention provides an international
liability framework for damages imposed and stipulates that the States
are equally liable for both public as well as private activities that are
undertaken on its soil.65 However, there are some issues that remain
unclear. For example, the Convention defines “launching State” as “[a]
State which launches or procures the launching of a space object” or “[a]
State from whose territory or facility the space object is launched”;
however, there is no definition of when the launch is deemed to start.66
Another issue is that the Liability Convention imposes strict liability on
the “launching state” for all damage caused by its space object on earth
or to any aircraft in flight.67 On the other hand, it imposes liability on
the launching State when a space object causes damage to the space
object of another State when the object is in the air or space only when
the launching state is at fault.68 Thus, domestic laws have to ensure that
62. Sundahl, supra note 57, at 179 (“Specifically, the governments of Argentina and
South Africa, in 2000 and 2004, respectively, notified the Secretary-General of the discovery
and planned return to the United States of space objects that had been found in their respective
territories.”).
63. Id. at 180.
64. Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar.
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention].
65. Sharda Balaji, Space: Liabilities in India and other countries, NOVOJURIS LEGAL
(Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.novojuris.com/thought-leadership/space-liabilities-in-indiaand-other-countries.html.
66. See Liability Convention, supra note 64, art. I, 24 U.S.T. at 2392, 961 U.N.T.S. at
189.
67. Liability Convention, supra note 64, art. II, 24 U.S.T. at 2392, 961 U.N.T.S. at 189.
68. Id. art. III, 24 U.S.T. at 2392, 961 U.N.T.S. at 190.
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States’ obligations under this Convention are met even where private
actors have entered the space sector. Most domestic laws have
introduced some form of insurance requirements as part of the licensing
regime to address this.69 Finally, although it establishes a Claims
Commission, its decisions are binding only if the parties to the dispute
have agreed to be bound by it.70 If not, the award will only be
recommendatory.71
The fourth treaty is the Convention on Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space (Registration Convention) which also has its
roots in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and requires all spacecraft to be
registered.72 One issue that has arisen with the Registration Convention
is that the Convention leaves it to state parties to determine which one
of them shall register the space object in the event that there are multiple
launching states.73 This has resulted in multiple jointly-launched space
objects not being registered on the United Nations Register of Objects
Launched into Outer Space.74 For instance, in 2002, the satellites NSS6 and NSS-7, which were built by a U.S. corporation for a Dutch
corporation, were launched by a French corporation from French
territory.75 However, despite being operational for over a decade, the
satellites could not be registered in the United Nations Register of
Objects Launched into Outer Space as all three states argued against
being the launching state for these satellites.76 Another concern is that
the Registration Convention does not recognize the transfer of
ownership of space objects.77 As a result, when a space object is sold to
a state which is not the original launching state, the new state which
gains ownership of the space object doesn’t incur any liability by virtue
of its acquisition.78 This is because the Liability Convention only
recognizes liabilities and damages with regard to the original launching

69. Sandeepa Bhat B., Space Liability Insurance: Concerns and Way Forward, 6
ATHENS J.L. 37, 40-41 (2020).
70. Id. art. XIX, 24 U.S.T. at 2400, 961 U.N.T.S. at 193.
71. Id.
72. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28
U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention].
73. Id. art. II, 28 U.S.T. at 698, 1023 U.N.T.S. at 17.
74. Jack Wright Nelson, Lost in Space? Gaps in the International Space Object
Registration Regime, EJIL: Talk! (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/lost-in-spacegaps-in-the-international-space-object-registration-regime/.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Zhao Yun, Revisiting the 1975 Registration Convention: Time for Revision?, 11
AUSTL INT’L L.J. 106, 110-11 (2004).
78. Id.
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state.79 These issues are likely to become more important with increased
cross-border commercial activity in this sector.
The fifth treaty is the Agreement Governing the Activities of States
on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1979 (Moon Agreement).80
The Moon Agreement deals with issues relating to exploration, use, and
exploitation of the moon and other celestial bodies within the solar
system.81 It clarifies that the moon and other celestial bodies should only
be used for peaceful purposes.82 For the purpose of this discussion, a
crucial provision of the Moon Agreement is Article 4 section 1 and states
as follows:
The exploration and use of the moon shall be the province of all
mankind and shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests
of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific
development. Due regard shall be paid to the interests of present and
future generations as well as to the need to promote higher standards
of living and conditions of economic and social progress and
development in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.83

Because of its wording, this clause casts doubt on whether corporations
or states may exploit resources of the moon and other celestial bodies for
commercial purposes. However, Article 11 of the Moon Agreement says
that the moon and other celestial bodies or any part of it shall not
“become property of any State, international intergovernmental or nongovernmental organization, national organization or non-governmental
entity or of any natural person.”84 This could be interpreted as a
prohibition on any property rights being assigned to corporations or
states with respect to resources procured from the moon or other celestial
bodies. Thus, some interpret this to mean that a moratorium is to be
placed on the commercial exploitation of resources until the
international regime is established.85 This interpretation might be
supported by the fact that Article 6 of the Moon Treaty allows scientific
investigation of the Moon and other celestial bodies, but nowhere in the
Treaty is commercial exploitation specifically approved.86 However,
commercial exploitation of space resources has explicitly been allowed

79. Id.
80. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Agreement].
81. See Moon Agreement, supra note 80, art. 1-2, at 22-23.
82. Id. art. 3, at 23.
83. Id. art. 4, § 1.
84. Id. art. 11, § 3, at 25.
85. Trimble, supra note 34, at 549.
86. Id. at 549-50.
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by some countries, thus challenging the relevance of the Moon
Agreement.
Another clause within the Moon Agreement, Article 4 section 2, is
worth highlighting here because of its relevance to the discussion in the
next section and Part II of this Article. It states that parties to the Moon
Agreement “shall be guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual
assistance in all their activities concerning the exploration and use of the
moon.”87 It further goes on to say that “[i]nternational co-operation in
pursuance of this Agreement should be as wide as possible and may take
place on a multilateral basis, on a bilateral basis or through international
intergovernmental organizations.”88 While this clause presumably
intends to nudge parties towards international cooperation via the United
Nations, it is worth noting that multilateral and bilateral agreements are
not ruled out. This suggests that agreements like the Artemis Accords,
discussed below, might not be outside the contemplation of the Moon
Agreement. Further, this clause, along with the fact that the Moon
Agreement did not get many signatories, could be pointing to a new era
in international space law. Gabrynowicz argues that international law is
now trending towards non-binding agreements rather than formal
treaties.89 To make the point, one of the examples she cites is the space
debris mitigation guidelines and terms of reference established by the
Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC).90 The
IADC consists of thirteen space agencies and describes itself as a “forum
for the worldwide coordination of activities related to the issues of manmade and natural debris in space.”91 The Artemis Accords, discussed in
the section below, might be viewed as part of this trend towards
multilateral cooperation between space agencies.
Before proceeding to the next section, it is worth noting that some
resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly deal with activities
in outer space. However, since the effect of these resolutions on states
under customary international law is unclear, they will be discussed very
briefly here.92 Despite dealing with various specific issues, the common

87.
88.
89.
90.

Moon Agreement, supra note 80, art. 4, § 2, at 23.
Id.
Gabrynowicz, supra note 49, at 747.
See INTER-AGENCY SPACE DEBRIS COORDINATION COMM., SUPPORT TO THE IADC
SPACE
DEBRIS
MITIGATION
GUIDELINES
(2021),
https://www.iadchome.org/documents_public/view/id/173#u.
91. What’s IADC, INTER-AGENCY SPACE DEBRIS COORDINATION COMMITTEE,
https://www.iadc-home.org/what_iadc (last visited Mar. 11, 2022).
92. Ricky J. Lee, Reconciling International Space Law with the Commercial Realities of
the Twenty-first Century, 4 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 194, 204 (2000).
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theme running through these resolutions is the promotion of
international and regional cooperation in various space-related activities.
First, the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 1962, promotes
international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space by
promoting exchange of information, international programs,
international sounding rocket facilities, education, and training related
to outer space.93 It also encourages member states to continue cooperative arrangement and mutual assistance.94
In the eighties, direct television broadcasting and remote-sensing
were the subject of United Nations resolutions. The Principles
Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for
International Direct Television Broadcasting, 1982, aim to align the
activities in the field of international direct television broadcasting by
satellites in a way that is compatible with the sovereign rights of the
States.95 The Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from
Outer Space, 1982, again aim to emphasize cooperation in remotesensing activities (i.e., “sensing of the Earth’s surface from space by
making use of the properties of electromagnetic waves emitted, reflected
or diffracted by the sensed objects, for the purpose of improving natural
resources management, land use and the protection of the
environment”).96 In particular, Principle VI encourages regional
agreements.97
Moving to the nineties, the Principles Relevant to the Use of
Nuclear Power Sources In Outer Space, 1992, aim to minimize the
quantity of radioactive material in space and the risks involved by
restricting the use of nuclear power sources in outer space to those space
missions which cannot be operated by non-nuclear energy sources in a
reasonable way.98 Again encouraging cooperation, it is emphasized that
states that have monitoring and tracking capabilities should provide
93. G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (Dec. 13, 1963).
94. Id. at § 6.
95. G.A. Res. 37/92, Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites
for International Direct Television Broadcasting (Dec. 10, 1982).
96. G.A. Res. 41/65, annex, Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from
Outer Space, principle I (Dec. 3, 1986).
97. Id. principle VI (“In order to maximize the availability of benefits from remote
sensing activities, States are encouraged, through agreements or other arrangements to provide
for the establishment and operation of data collecting and storage stations and processing and
interpretation facilities, in particular within the framework of regional agreements or
arrangements wherever feasible.”).
98. G.A. Res. 47/68, Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer
Space (Dec. 14, 1992).
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assistance to states expecting re-entry of space objects with nuclear
power sources.99 Finally, the Declaration on International Cooperation
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the
Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of
Developing Countries, 1996, encourages cooperation in space science
and technology by fostering the relevant facilities in the interested and
developing states through the exchange of expertise and technology.100
2. The Artemis accords and other bilateral agreements
The United States space agency, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), announced a set of bilateral agreements called
the Artemis Accords in 2020, which has taken the space law
conversation by storm.101 The Accords address many of the gaps in the
treaties discussed earlier in this Article, thus providing a more modern
framework.
The Accords trace their origin to NASA’s Artemis program, and
apply to activities of signatories that “take place on the Moon, Mars,
comets, and asteroids, including their surfaces and subsurfaces, as well
as in orbit of the Moon or Mars, in the Lagrangian points for the EarthMoon system, and in transit between these celestial bodies and
locations.”102 The recitals to the Artemis Accords makes it clear that
corporate actors are also envisaged in space activity. Specifically, it says
that the goal is sustainable space activity by collaborating with
“international and commercial partners.”103 Section 5, which deals with
interoperability, also emphasizes that “commercial utilization” of
resources is contemplated.104
The sections in the Accords contain principles that can be
categorized into two main heads. The first category includes those
pertaining to functional issues that facilitate cooperation. These issues
include peaceful exploration, transparency, interoperability of space
exploration infrastructure (for example, space suits of different
astronauts being able to communicate with each other), providing

99. Id. principle 7.
100. G.A. Res. 51/122, annex, Declaration on International Cooperation in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking
into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries (Dec. 13, 1996).
101. NASA, THE ARTEMIS ACCORDS: PRINCIPLE FOR COOPERATION IN THE CIVIL
EXPLORATION AND USE OF THE MOON, MARS, COMETS, AND ASTEROIDS FOR PEACEFUL
PURPOSES (2020), https://www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis-accords/img/Artemis-Accordssigned-13Oct2020.pdf.
102. Id. § 1, at 2.
103. Id. at 1.
104. Id. § 5, at 3.
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emergency assistance to personnel in outer space, cooperation regarding
registration of space objects, and open sharing of scientific data.105 The
second category can be thought of as including sustainability issues.
These include preserving outer space heritage, extraction and utilization
of space resources “in a manner that complies with the Outer Space
Treaty and in support of safe and sustainable space activities,”
deconfliction of space activities, and mitigation of orbital debris.106
Under both categories, the Artemis Accords provide broad principles
rather than very specific rules. It is also important to note here that the
publicly available version of the Artemis Accords is just a summary and
that the full text is still being negotiated by signatories.107
One section of the Artemis Accords that has perhaps not received
the attention it deserves is Section 6, which deals with emergency
assistance.108 It is as follows: “The Signatories commit to taking all
reasonable efforts to render necessary assistance to personnel in outer
space who are in distress, and acknowledge their obligations under the
Rescue and Return Agreement.”
Clearly, this section aims to reiterate and update the Rescue and
Return Agreement by committing to providing assistance in outer space,
which as the discussion above shows, was not clearly stated in the
Rescue and Return Agreement. Also, to be noted is the use of the
broader term “personnel” rather than “astronauts,” which would mean
that space tourists could be covered.109 The fact that commercial activity
is contemplated by the Accords should again suggest that space tourists
would be included in the definition of personnel.
One could say that the section on space mining is perhaps the most
controversial of all its sections. The Artemis Accords allow the mining
of space resources, thus taking a decisive step on the contested issue.110
The only stipulation provided is that historic locations such as the Apollo
landing sites are to be protected.111 However, the Artemis Accords aim
to situate itself within the Outer Space Treaty. It states that the
signatories “intend to use their experience under the Accords to
105. Id. §§ 3–8, at 3–4.
106. Id. §§ 9–12, at 4–7.
107. Space Court Foundation, Artemis Accords and the Future of Space Governance
(Special Guest: Mike Gold) | SCFVideo3, YOUTUBE (Aug. 26, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hnl6cP3ACRc&t=1260s.
108. NASA, supra note 101, § 6, at 3.
109. Id.
110. Joey Roulette, Exclusive: Trump administration drafting ‘Artemis Accords’ pact for
moon mining – sources, REUTERS (May 5, 2020, 1:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-space-exploration-moon-mining-exclusi/exclusive-trump-administration-draftingartemis-accords-pact-for-moon-mining-sources idUSKBN22H2SB.
111. NASA, supra note 101, § 9, at 4.
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contribute to multilateral efforts to further develop international
practices and rules applicable to the extraction and utilization of space
resources, including through ongoing efforts at the [Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS)].”112 A similar intention is
articulated in the context of sections dealing with preserving space
heritage, and deconfliction of space activities.113
Despite this, the Accords have come under criticism from
international law scholars. It has been argued that the Accords are a
means of working around the prohibition on the appropriation of space
resources set out in the Outer Space Treaty.114 Others believe that the
Accords represent a radical departure from space governance as the
United States has used bilateral agreements to establish norms of
behaviour in this regard.115 All earlier attempts to govern space have
been through “painstakingly negotiated international treaties.”116
Likewise, several states have expressed reservations over the negotiation
of these Accords outside the ambit of international institutions such as
the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.117 For
instance, spacefaring nations such as Russia and China have opposed
these accords with Russia, terming the Accords as too “U.S.-centric” for
it to participate.118
However, the fact remains that countries like Australia, Canada,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom,
Ukraine, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea have signed the
Artemis Accords along with the United States.119 Furthermore, critics
who emphasize that the Accords were not the product of U.N.-facilitated
international negotiations need to recognize that space exploration had
112. Id. § 10(4), at 5.
113. Id. §§ 9(2), 11(6), at 4-5.
114. John Hickman, Opinion - The Unimpressive Nature of the Artemis Accords, E-INT’L
REL. (Oct. 19, 2020), https://www.e-ir.info/2020/10/19/opinion-the-unimpressive-nature-ofthe-artemis-accords/.
115. See Jack Wright Nelson, The Artemis Accords and the Future of International Space
Law,
24
ASIL
INSIGHTS,
Dec.
10,
2020,
at
1,
https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/ASIL_Insights_2020_V24_I31.pdf.
116. Christopher Newman, Artemis Accords: why many countries are refusing to sign
Moon exploration agreement, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 19, 2020, 7:45 AM),
https://theconversation.com/artemis-accords-why-many-countries-are-refusing-to-signmoon-exploration-agreement-148134.
117. Id.
118. Jeff Foust, Russia skeptical about participating in lunar Gateway, SPACENEWS (Oct.
12, 2020), https://spacenews.com/russia-skeptical-about-participating-in-lunar-gateway/.
119. Sean Potter & Cheryl Warner, NASA, International Partners Advance Cooperation
with First Signings of Artemis Accords, NASA (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.nasa.gov/pressrelease/nasa-international-partners-advance-cooperation-with-first-signings-of-artemisaccords.
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already progressed beyond what the international treaty regime
envisaged when the Artemis Accords were introduced. As pointed out
earlier, specific changes in some treaties are now required to address new
technological developments and business endeavors. Further, the Moon
Agreement, which was a product of negotiations via international
institutions, did not get the support of the major spacefaring nations.120
The Moon Agreement itself sets out that international cooperation in
pursuance of it, “should be as wide as possible and may take place on a
multilateral basis, on a bilateral basis or through international
intergovernmental organizations.”121 The Artemis Accords are a
multilateral effort that, even if initiated by the United States, addresses
gaps in the Moon Agreement. In fact, as a senior analyst at the
Australian Strategic Policy Institute argues, since signatories of the
Artemis Accords have declared that they will not claim territory on the
moon or other celestial bodies for themselves, it pressures states that are
not signatory to the Accords to also play by the same rules.122
At a space agency level, the European Space Administration (ESA)
signed a “Gateway Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)” with the
United States which “will see ESA Member States contribute a number
of essential elements to the first human outpost in lunar orbit, known as
the Gateway.”123 The Gateway is part of the Artemis program.124
However, the ESA has clarified that operations beyond the Gateway, like
those taking place on the surface of the moon, are not part of the MoU.125
Even outside of the Artemis Accords, there have been MoUs and
agreements between space agencies. For instance, the Australian Space
Agency has signed a statement of intent with the Italian Space Agency
in early 2020 to “consider a joint Australia-Italy activity on the

120. Michael Listner, The Moon Treaty: failed international law or waiting in the
shadows?, SPACE REV. (Oct. 24, 2011), https://www.thespacereview.com/article/1954/1
(“[T]he three major spacefaring nations (“the Big Three”) are non-parties to the Moon Treaty,
which has led to the opinion that the Moon Treaty is a failure as a treaty and international
law.”).
121. Moon Agreement, supra note 80, art. 4, § 2, at 23.
122. Malcolm Davies, Commitment to Artemis Accords affirms Australia’s rising star in
space, AUSTL. STRATEGIC POL’Y INST.: THE STRATEGIST (Jan. 12, 2021),
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/commitment-to-artemis-accords-affirms-australias-risingstar-in-space.
123. Positive signs for Europe as ESA goes forward to the Moon, EUR. SPACE AGENCY
(Oct.
27,
2020),
https://www.esa.int/Science_Exploration/Human_and_Robotic_
Exploration/Positive_signs_for_Europe_as_ESA_goes_forward_to_the_Moon.
124. Id.
125. Gateway MoU and Artemis Accords – FAQs, EUR. SPACE AGENCY,
https://www.esa.int/Science_Exploration/Human_and_Robotic_Exploration/Gateway_MoU
_and_Artemis_Accords_FAQs (last visited Apr. 12, 2022).
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International Space Station.”126 The joint activity could include the
development of payloads, and the execution of scientific or
technological investigations. Australian Space Agency has signed
similar letters of intent with space agencies (or relevant governing
bodies) in New Zealand, Germany, the United States, and Europe.127
More interestingly, MoUs have been entered into by the Australian
Space Agency with its counterparts in Canada, U.K., and U.A.E.128 The
MoUs are more substantial than letters of intent to cooperate. For
instance, the MoU between the Australian Space Agency and the UK
Space Agency “provides a framework for collaborative activities and the
exchange of information, technology and personnel” between the two
countries.129 One of the areas of cooperation includes the “[e]xchange
of views on space policy, law and regulation.”130 The MoU further
specifies that it will “place no financial, legal or other type of
commitment on either” of the two space agencies or their respective
governments.131 Thus, the MoUs serve the function of allowing space
agencies of different countries to collaborate not only on scientific
aspects but also on law, regulation, and policymaking in the nascent
field—albeit without placing any legal commitments on the parties
involved. Australia is not alone in entering into such MoUs with
different countries at the space agency level.
The Artemis Accords being signed by more spacefaring nations
than the Moon Treaty, along with the proliferation of MoUs and letters
of intent between space agencies in different countries, indicates, as
Gabrynowicz has argued, that international law is now trending towards
non-binding agreements rather than formal treaties.132 It also indicates
that there is an appetite for business collaboration in the New Space
sector. Such appetite can be harnessed to achieve both business
collaborations across countries and safeguards, such as preventing the

126. Australian Space Agency signs statement of intent with Italian Space Agency, AUSTL.
GOV’T DEP’T INDUSTRY, SCI., ENERGY & RESOURCES (Feb. 17, 2020),
https://www.industry.gov.au/news-media/australian-space-agency-signs-statement-of-intentwith-italian-space-agency.
127. See Australian Space Agency News, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T INDUSTRY, SCI., ENERGY
&
RESOURCES,
https://www.industry.gov.au/news/australian-space-agencynews?field_news_section_tid=2583 (last visited Feb. 6, 2021).
128. Id.
129. Australian Space Agency signs with United Kingdom Space Agency, AUSTL. GOV’T
DEP’T
INDUSTRY,
SCI.,
ENERGY
&
RESOURCES
(Oct.
2,
2018),
https://www.industry.gov.au/news-media/australian-space-agency-signs-with-unitedkingdom-space-agency.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Gabrynowicz, supra note 49, at 747.
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accumulation of space debris. Such collaborations will be important in
the absence of cooperation amongst nation-states through an
international treaty regarding commercial space activity. Eventually,
such collaborations may even lead to an international treaty
incorporating the best practices that develop through these processes.
The next section will discuss how such collaboration has worked in
another new industry, fintech, in order to draw lessons where pertinent.
III. REGULATORY SANDBOXES - LESSONS FROM FINTECH
A regulatory sandbox is a temporary test area that allows for
experimentation and innovation on the one hand and regulatory
discovery on the other.133 Within this phase, the regulations typically
allow for exemptions from certain prohibitions, approval requirements,
etc.134 The knowledge problem, as Friedrich Hayek described it, is a
situation where the planners (government or even regulatory bodies)
may not have the required information about the activity.135 This
problem is especially acute in most new and fast-developing technology
sectors. Regulatory sandboxes solve this problem by allowing a test
phase where the regulator can learn from those engaged in the relevant
sector and, during that time, ensure that innovation is not stymied by
uninformed regulation.136
While regulatory sandboxing has been used predominantly in the
fintech industry, its use may also be relevant to any new and fastdeveloping sector where it is beneficial to allow innovation while
regulators are still working out the most effective regulatory
mechanisms.137 For instance, the regulatory sandbox tool is now starting
to be used in the legal services sector of Canada and the United States.
In April 2021, the Law Society of Ontario (in Canada) approved a
regulatory sandbox with a five-year term to “encourage the development
of innovative technological legal services in the province.”138 Approved
133. FED. MINISTRY FOR ECON. AFFAIRS & ENERGY, MAKING SPACE FOR INNOVATION:
THE
HANDBOOK
OF
REGULATORY
SANDBOXES
7
(2019),
https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Publikationen/Digitale-Welt/handbook-regulatorysandboxes.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2.
134. Id. at 39.
135. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519-30
(1945).
136. Christopher M. Bruner, Distributed Ledgers, Artificial Intelligence, and the Purpose
of the Corporation, 79 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 431, 456 (2020).
137. Id. at 456. Bruner suggests that the concept of regulatory sandboxes might be used
in the context of corporate governance-related innovations as has been done in the context of
the fintech sector.
138. Dale Smith, Law Society of Ontario approves regulatory sandbox for legal tech,
CBA/ABC NATIONAL
(Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.nationalmagazine.ca/en-
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participants will be given a two-year window within the sandbox to serve
consumers with innovative legal technologies, while also complying
with “risk-based monitoring and reporting requirements.”139 In the
United States, Utah launched a regulatory sandbox for ‘non-traditional’
legal services in August 2020 for a two-year period.140 Utah later
extended the Utah sandbox by another five years because of its
success.141 Following Utah’s sandbox, British Columbia in Canada also
launched a regulatory sandbox for legal tech innovation in December
2020.142 This Part will mainly study the use of regulatory sandboxes in
fintech.
Regulatory sandboxes in the fintech sector have allowed innovative
fintech businesses to ‘test’ their business concepts without having to
comply with certain financial regulations by exempting them from
licensing and regulatory requirements on a conditional basis.143 As they
were first used in 2016, sandboxes are a relatively recent development
in financial regulation.144 However, they now represent a major element
of new regulatory approaches involving fintech.145
As a precondition to enter and participate in the sandbox, regulators
usually require companies to satisfy some tests. Professor Dirk Zetzsche
and his co-authors identify three such pre-conditions based on practices
in various jurisdictions.146 The first is that the firm should support the
financial services industry.147 The second and third are that the firm
should provide genuine innovation (i.e., new solutions to existing or new
problems) and benefit customers.148 Zetzsche et al. argue that the benefit
of the first test is debatable since it requires the regulator to assess an

ca/articles/legal-market/regulatory/2021/law-society-of-ontario-approves-regulatorysandbox.
139. Id.
140. Sam Skolnik & Melissa Heelan Stanzione, Utah Court OKs Pathbreaking Pilot on
New Legal Service Models, BLOOMBERG LAW (Aug. 14, 2020, 11:55 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/utah-court-oks-pathbreaking-pilot-on-newlegal-service-models.
141. Id.; Rhys Dipshan, Utah Adds 5 Years to Regulatory Sandbox Program Fostering
Legal
Services
Innovation,
LAW.COM
(May
4,
2021,
1:43
PM),
https://www.law.com/legaltechnews/2021/05/04/utah-adds-five-years-to-regulatorysandbox-program-fostering-legal-services-innovation/?slreturn=20210516005954.
142. Smith, supra note 138.
143. See Lev Bromberg, Andrew Godwin & Ian Ramsay, Fintech Sandboxes: Achieving
a Balance Between Regulation and Innovation, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. L. & PRAC. 314 (2017).
144. See id.
145. See Hilary J. Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 579, 596 (2019).
146. Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., Regulating a Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes to
Smart Regulation, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 69-70 (2017).
147. Id.
148. Id.
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innovation, which is outside their skillset.149 Recognizing the limitation,
some regulators do not use these tests and simply focus on a risk
analysis, which seeks to look at the impact of the firm on market stability
and market transparency, or at whether the firm has adequate processes
to protect customers and the broader financial system.150 The idea is that
knowledge gained through sandboxes will eventually feed into
standardized regulatory requirements to ensure that the risks are
managed appropriately. It might also help regulators determine the
relevant technology that can then be used to regulate the new
technologies. This has come to be known as regulatory technology or
regtech. Ultimately, the extent to which sandboxes can promote
innovation would mainly depend on whether there is in-depth
knowledge exchange between innovator and regulator.151 From the
perspective of companies entering the sandbox, benefits include
certainty in terms of applicable rules; enhanced communication with
regulators; and, as a consequence of this, quicker entry into the
market.152 The regulatory sandboxes usually have a set term.
Participants may also be removed from the sandbox if they fail to comply
with the rules, engage in misconduct, or simply fail to achieve their
stated purpose.153
One important concern with regulatory sandboxes is the potential
lack of transparency. It is important for regulators to disclose details of
all concessions made within the sandbox, which would not only level the
playing field for interested firms but also create legal certainty.154 An
effective sandbox would, at the very least, be expected to ease
communications with the regulator and also make such necessary
information readily available. Over and above this, communication
channels between the regulator and prospective players in the sandbox
should remain open.
Some countries have used innovation hubs (which also facilitate
information exchange and communication with the regulator)155 instead
of regulatory sandboxes, and some others have used a hybrid model. The

149. Id.
150. Id. at 70-71.
151. Id. at 79.
152. Wolf-Georg Ringe & Christopher Ruof, Regulating Fintech in the EU: The Case for
a Guided Sandbox, 11 EUR. J. RISK REG. 604, 611–612 (2020).
153. Id. at 610-11.
154. Id. at 619.
155. See RADOSTINA PARENTI ET AL., EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, REGULATORY
SANDBOXES
AND
INNOVATION
HUBS
FOR
FINTECH
20
(2020),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/652752/IPOL_STU(2020)652
752_EN.pdf.
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main distinction between the two is that an innovation hub does not
allow businesses to interact with customers, while the sandbox allows
for products to be tested in the market and thus also implies closer
regulatory monitoring.156 Some countries in the European Union
(Sweden and Germany, for example) have set up innovation hubs, but
seem hesitant or unwilling to set up regulatory sandboxes.157 All the
benefits of regulatory sandboxes outlined thus far are also applicable to
innovation hubs, although regulatory sandboxes offer an additional
benefit of signaling the regulator’s openness to the industry.158 As
evidence of the signaling effect of a regulatory sandbox, particularly one
that is well-run, Ringe and Ruof note that London has become a fintech
hub as a result of the FCA’s regulatory sandbox.159 Ultimately, each
jurisdiction will have different needs and whether it adopts an innovation
hub or a regulator sandbox will depend on local factors. While
innovation hubs may be better in jurisdictions where innovation needs
to be fostered, regulatory sandboxes would work well where there is a
significant number of innovation-focused firms and where the regulatory
framework needs to catch up with the level of innovation in the
industry.160
The benefits of regulatory sandboxes are generally enhanced if
sandboxes also operate across borders. Businesses can test the viability
of their concepts in multiple jurisdictions via regulatory sandbox bridges
or agreements between the market regulators across jurisdictions.161
This is beneficial to the companies involved because, rather than being
required to comply with different laws, the regulatory bridge allows
them to test their innovations in a uniform framework across the
jurisdictions participating in the regulatory sandbox bridge.162 The
sandbox bridges may also include a framework for information sharing
with regard to regtech.163 Examples of such regulatory sandbox bridges
in fintech include a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the
UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Australian Securities
and Investments Commission (ASIC) agreeing to support firms in
156. See id. at 19-20.
157. Id. at 22.
158. See Ross P. Buckley et al., Building Fintech Ecosystems: Regulatory Sandboxes,
Innovation Hubs and Beyond, 61 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 70-76 (2020).
159. Ringe & Ruof, supra note 152, at 612.
160. Id. at 617.
161. See Lev Bromberg, Andrew Godwin & Ian Ramsay, Cross-Border Cooperation in
Financial Regulation: Crossing the Fintech Bridge, 13 CAP. MARKETS L.J. 59 (2018).
162. Id. at 22-23.
163. See Lev Bromberg, Andrew Godwin & Ian Ramsay, Sandboxes and Bridges – the
Impact of Fintech on Regulatory Convergence and Coordination in Asia, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON ASIAN FINANCIAL LAW 547, 549 (Douglas W. Arner, et. al. eds., 2020).
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navigating the regulatory system in each market.164 Firms that meet
certain eligibility criteria can access the regulatory sandboxes in both
countries.165 The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)
has similar arrangements for firms doing business in these countries.166
In addition to sandbox bridges between regulators of two states, the
Global Financial Innovation Network (GFIN), a cross-border regulatory
sandbox, was set up in 2018.167 The GFIN was set up to enable
regulators across participating jurisdictions to be able to collaborate and
share information about emerging technologies, business models, and
regtech, and to trial cross-border solutions.168 In addition to this, they
also aimed to provide accessible regulatory contact information for
firms.169 In 2020, the GFIN introduced a single-entry application form
for firms seeking to operate in the participating jurisdictions, thus further
easing barriers to entry.170 The eligibility requirements for businesses
seeking to apply are as follows:171
1. The product will provide identifiable benefits.
2. The product is established and is ready to be tested in a
regulatory/supervisory sandbox in at least one jurisdiction.
3. If applicable, the innovative product has been discussed with the
applicant’s principal regulatory/supervisory authority.
4. The applicant should have reviewed the compendiums
(containing information about regulations in all participating
jurisdictions) and should confirm that the innovative product is
covered there.

164. UK-Australia
FinTech
Bridge,
U.K.-Austl.,
Mar.
22,
2018,
https://cdn.treasury.gov.au/uploads/sites/1/2018/03/UK-Australia-FinTech-Bridge.pdf.
165. Ana Badour & Nicole Chiarelli, Australia and UK Establish “Fintech Bridge”: A
Model for Canada?, LEXOLOGY (July 16, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=8917b7fb-c653-4213-ba17-efff0606c503.
166. Curtis M. Dombek & Emilio Cazares, The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
– Paving the Way For A Cross-Border Fintech Sandbox, SHEPPARDMULLIN: LATIN AM.
BLOG (June 8, 2020), https://www.latinolawblog.com/2020/05/articles/commerce/usmcacross-border-fintech-sandbox/.
167. Global sandbox accepts first eight firms, FINEXTRA (Apr. 29, 2019),
https://www.finextra.com/newsarticle/33740/global-sandbox-accepts-first-eight-firms;
Global Financial Innovation Network (GFIN), FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/innovation/global-financial-innovation-network.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. GLOB. FIN. INNOVATION NETWORK, GFIN CROSS-BORDER TESTING APPLICATION
5 (n.d.), https://www.bma.bm/viewPDF/documents/2020-10-29-17-33-23-GFIN-CrossBorder-Testing-Application.PDF.
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5. The applicant should confirm that they understand the risks that
their innovative product entails and that they have taken
necessary steps to mitigate those risks.
6. The applicant should be responsive in addressing questions and
concerns from GFIN members while participating in the crossborder testing.
7. The applicant should consent to the use of information they
submit by the GFIN while discharging its functions.
These criteria indicate the goal of easing access to different markets
within the sandbox alongside risk-management.
The European Union, which was initially less enthusiastic about
regulatory sandboxes, proposed a regulatory sandbox for distributed
ledger technology (DLT) and blockchain services in September 2020.172
Known as the DLT Pilot Regime, the regulatory sandbox allows
applicants fulfilling the eligibility criteria to operate across the whole EU
market.173 Under this proposal, the European Securities and Markets
Authority (ESMA) plays a central role, coordinating between the
national authorities.174 While academics have suggested that the model
could be more dynamic,175 the DLT Pilot is still an exciting development
from the perspective of the EU experimenting with the regulatory
sandbox model.
Despite the widespread appeal of regulatory sandbox bridges in the
fintech sector, Professor Hillary Allen has cautioned that financial
stability regulation should be the main concern of any regulatory regime
in fintech, in order to prevent financial crises.176 This is a valid concern
and should be heeded and adapted by regulators in sectors like New
Space while importing the regulatory sandbox idea from fintech. The
concerns in New Space are different from those in fintech (as will be
discussed later) but nevertheless just as important, if not more.
Further, Allen cautions that there could be a race to the bottom if
some jurisdictions prioritize efficiency and competition over consumer
protection and financial stability.177 Companies would then engage in
172. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a
Pilot Regime for Market Infrastructures Based on Distributed Ledger Technology, COM
(2020)
594
final
(Sept.
24,
2020),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020PC0594&from=EN.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Wolf-Georg Ringe & Christopher Ruof, The DLT Pilot Regime: An EU Sandbox, at
Last!,
U.
Oxford:
OXFORD
BUS.
L.
BLOG
(Nov.
19,
2020),
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2020/11/dlt-pilot-regime-eu-sandbox-last.
176. Hilary J. Allen, Sandbox Boundaries, 22 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 299, 308 (2020)
[hereinafter Allen, Sandbox Boundaries].
177. Id. at 310.
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regulatory arbitrage and prefer jurisdictions with fewer safeguards. This
problem may, in theory, be assuaged through cross-border regulatory
sandbox initiatives such as the GFIN which, as Allen says, can be
understood as a coordination mechanism between nations to develop
regulatory best practices that “maximize[] efficiency and promote[]
competition, while minimizing harm to consumers and financial
stability.”178 Similar principles may be imported into the New Space
sector as well. Even beyond domestic regulatory regimes, firms
themselves have started to look for social legitimacy, and Professor
Hilary Allen argues that this is particularly true for fintech companies
where consumer trust is important.179 This is also true in other sectors,
including New Space, as will be discussed below.
IV. REGULATORY SANDBOXES FOR NEW SPACE
The fact that a treaty-based regime was insufficient had been
recognized long before the Artemis Accords was introduced in 2020.
For instance, Lee argued in 2000 that there was a need for “new and
adapted rules of international space law” in the face of rapid
technological progress.180 Twenty years later, international law on this
issue is still lacking. Many states have introduced domestic legislation
to regulate corporate activity in space and others are in the process of
introducing such legislation.181 However, not all space activities are
covered by domestic legislation.
The fast pace of innovation in this sector has resulted in issues like
space mining, space debris, etc. that need to be addressed.182 There are
firms trying to innovate to solve some space sustainability issues, while
others are finding ways to enhance connectivity or provide crucial data
on climate change via space technologies. Effective regulation can

178. Id. at 313.
179. Id. at 314.
180. Lee, supra note 92, at 196.
181. US, UK, Australia, and New Zealand are some examples of countries which have
introduced domestic space legislation. National Space Law, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR
OUTER SPACE AFF., https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/nationalspacelaw
/index.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2022). India is currently in the process of introducing a
domestic space legislation. See Martand Jha, From allowing private players, to regulating
satellite use, why India needs a space law, FIRSTPOST (Oct. 3, 2021, 1:07 PM),
https://www.firstpost.com/india/from-making-provisions-for-private-players-to-regulatingsatellite-use-why-india-needs-a-new-space-law-10020521.html. For incentives of countries
to introduce domestic space laws, see Irmgard Marboe & Karin Traunmuller, Small Satellites
and Small States: New Incentives for National Space Legislation, 38 J. SPACE L. 289 (2012).
182. While the United States, Luxembourg, U.A.E., and Japan have legislated to explicitly
allow space mining, the international consensus on this is unclear.
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encourage such innovation.183 Further, rapid technological development
means that regulators have to address new innovations before
policymakers can decide on appropriate legislation. States must be
careful to ensure that laws do not stymie innovation in an area that holds
much promise.
Most jurisdictions are aware of the promise of New Space and are
seeking to foster innovation. For instance, the E.U.’s 2021 space
strategy aims to foster space entrepreneurship with its entrepreneurship
initiative (CASSINI) making a €1 billion investment in New Space.184
Innovation hubs and regulatory sandboxes in New Space would help
achieve such innovation, while also addressing risks, as was the case in
the fintech sector. Although the idea of regulatory sandboxes has not
been proposed by policymakers or academics in the space sector so far,
Helena Correia Mendonça—a lawyer based in Portugal—has made out
a case for it.185 As she has rightly argued, a regulatory sandbox would
be beneficial to nurture and regulate the New Space sector.186 She has
further explained that the legal framework for New Space activities
being under-developed, coupled with the fact that technological
advancements in the space sector have implications beyond space law,
make the case for a regulatory sandbox even more compelling.187 Such
a sandbox would help assess “the best routes for new smart legal
frameworks.”188
While countries with smaller New Space activity can consider
innovation hubs, countries like Luxembourg, which probably has the
most thriving space industry in Europe,189 would find regulatory
sandboxes useful. Even countries with a fledgling New Space sector can
opt for a regulatory sandbox, or a mixed model consisting of an
innovation hub and a sandbox, in order to provide a positive signal to the
industry. Typically, regulatory sandboxes are set up for a certain period
183. See e.g., Mercedes Ruehl, Companies vie to develop ways to dispose of space junk,
FIN. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/fe4e89a0-5b51-11e9-939a341f5ada9d40.
184. Martin Banks, Europe can become an innovative space technology hub, says Thierry
Breton, PARLIAMENT, POL., POL’Y & PEOPLE MAG. (Jan. 15, 2021),
https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/europe-can-become-a-innovativespace-technology-hub-says-thierry-breton.
185. Helena Correia Mendonça, Regulatory Sandboxes Spur Innovation in the Space
Sector, VIA SATELLITE (Oct. 16, 2020), http://interactive.satellitetoday.com/regulatorysandboxes-spur-innovation-in-the-space-sector/.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Elie Dolgin, The New Capital of the Private Space Industry, SCI. AM. (May 15, 2017)
https://www.scientificamerican.com/custom-media/luxembourgs-innovation-is-out-of-thisworld/the-new-capital-of-the-private-space-industry/.
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of time; it would be up to domestic regulators to decide the term of such
sandboxes. It would also be up to each country’s strategic priorities and
strengths to identify the types of space activity that will be eligible to
access the sandbox. Such sandboxes would help regulators design smart
regulation that addresses the gaps in current laws. The terms of entry
into the sandbox could also require companies to make efforts to operate
sustainably and to identify risks that become evident along the way. This
would create a feedback loop from the industry to those regulatory
authorities.190 Eventually, the knowledge gained by space regulators
could be used in broader policy discussions about how other areas of law
(data protection, confidentiality, insurance, dispute resolution, etc.)
should apply to the use of space technologies.
To some extent, many countries have already started experimenting
with space regimes/polices that do not qualify as formal sandboxes. For
example, the New Zealand space regime learnt from and responded to
the operations of Rocket Lab, the subsidiary of a U.S. company, in New
Zealand by incorporating specific terms relating to the export of
technology.191 Domestic legislation for the sector in many countries is
set out in broad terms so as to be enabling.192 Secondary legislation and
space agencies would then have to set out more specific rules as and
when necessary.193 Regulatory sandboxes could help formulate optimal
rules, based on appropriate information and practical feedback from the
industry.
Further, regulators (space agencies) often see one of their roles as
that of assisting entrepreneurs. For instance, the European Space
Agency’s (ESA) new chief, Josef Aschbacher, has spoken of opening up
ESA’s expertise to start-ups in Europe.194 The U.A.E. Space Agency has
already launched an innovation hub that aims to allow start-ups to access
relevant facilities and networks of investors.195 The U.K. has recently
launched a campaign that seeks to find solutions to “major space
190. Jeff Foust, Space industry seeks continued progress on regulatory reform, SPACE
NEWS (Oct. 30, 2020), https://spacenews.com/space-industry-seeks-continued-progress-onregulatory-reform/.
191. Joel Lisk & Melissa de Zwart, Watch this Space: The Development of Commercial
Space Law in Australia and New Zealand, 47 FED. L. REV. 444, 447-48 (2019).
192. For a discussion of the UK legislation see Alexander Simmonds, The Space Industry
Act 2018: A Giant Leap?, 24 COVENTRY L.J. 95, 99 (2020).
193. Id.
194. Peggy Hollinger & Clive Cookson, Europe’s new space chief is on a mission to
reinvigorate the agency, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/abf65e889d51-4bef-9769-1e9eeca2b7ee.
195. UAE Space Agency and Krypto Labs Launch UAE New Space Innovation
Programme, SPACEWATCH GLOBAL, https://spacewatch.global/2020/01/uae-space-agencyand-krypto-labs-launch-uae-newspace-innovation-programme/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2022).
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hurdles” and also provide seed funding for such ventures.196 A
regulatory sandbox aimed at such new ventures could also reduce
barriers to entry.
Now that space regulators are realizing the value of promoting
innovation in the New Space sector, they can learn from the regulatory
sandboxes that were widely adopted in the fintech sector. It is also
important for national (and regional, in the case of the ESA) space
agencies to not only set up sandboxes, but to also build regulatory
sandbox bridges with space agencies of other countries, again along the
lines of what we have seen in the fintech sector. This will create
incentives for cooperation and sustainable practices along the lines of
what countries have agreed to in international space treaties. Like in
fintech, one could imagine various space agencies entering into
regulatory sandbox bridges to allow firms of one country to operate in
the markets of the other country. Additionally, such bridges can
facilitate agreement on other mutually beneficial issues that are currently
unregulated, like the rescue and return of astronauts and spacecraft.197
We could imagine the MoU setting up the sandbox bridge to include a
term about space tourism companies needing to take reasonable
measures to rescue personnel of other companies (registered in the
signatory countries) in case of distress. Regulatory sandbox bridges may
in fact serve to clarify and bring a more practical consensus to issues that
remained unresolved in international treaties.
The Artemis Accords provide a helpful set of principles that
contemplate commercial activity within its paradigm of collaboration
between states. However, they do not address specific issues relevant to
regulating the New Space sector. As Mike Gold, a former NASA
official, specifically emphasized in a recent talk, the Artemis Accords
were government-to-government agreements and more specific rules
will be required in each country to govern the private sector.198 Thus, it
will be the role of domestic legislation to device specific rules and update
them when there are technological innovations. However, the lawmaking process in most countries is too slow to keep up with innovation
in this field. Regulatory sandboxes are thus extremely appropriate at this
time of high innovation in this sector.

196. Finding next-gen space tech: DASA launches the Space to Innovate Campaign,
GOV.UK (June 16, 2021), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/finding-next-gen-spacetech-dasa-launches-the-space-to-innovate-campaign.
197. See supra Part 1.
198. Space Court Found., Artemis Accords and the Future of Space Governance (Special
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|
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(Aug.
27,
2020),
https://youtu.be/Hnl6cP3ACRc?t=1440.
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Further, not all spacefaring nations are signatories to the Artemis
Accords.199 NASA’s agreement with ESA suggests that even countries
that are not signatories to the Accords may find it useful to collaborate
on specific issues.200 Similarly, agreements between various space
agencies show that a model similar to sandbox bridges used in fintech
might be starting to develop. This must be fostered in order to ensure
that New Space may evolve in a manner that is useful and also
sustainable. When the private players collaborate across jurisdictions,
there will be benefits to both big industry players (like SpaceX, Blue
Origen, etc.), since new markets would become more easily accessible,
and smaller companies and start-ups in other jurisdictions that would be
able to collaborate with these large players. Such collaborations across
countries, particularly those that collaborate with both the United States
on the one hand and Russia and China on the other, would create
economic interdependencies and reduce the likelihood of tensions.
V. ARE REGULATORY SANDBOXES FOR NEW SPACE SAFE?
Taking lessons from the fintech space also means that concerns
emerging out of that model should be heeded when adapting it to the
space sector. With fintech, the issues revolve around balancing
consumer protection and financial stability with enabling innovation and
competition. In the space sector, there is a general concern about
ensuring that all space activity is conducted sustainably.201 It is therefore
important for regulatory sandboxes to incorporate sustainability
safeguards. Since the Artemis Accords already incorporate principles of
sustainability, we can expect that regulators will continue to prioritize
this in domestic and cross-border sandboxes. As Allen has noted, a
cross-border sandbox, like the GFIN, will prevent a race to the bottom,
since jurisdictions that deviate too much might not be included in such
an initiative.202
Further, as Allen has said in the fintech context, companies,
particularly in newer industries, require social legitimacy to succeed.203
Anecdotal evidence suggests that companies in the space sector are
making voluntary efforts to ensure that their activities are sustainable.
For instance, SpaceX has begun to voluntarily address the issue of orbital
light pollution (caused when objects orbiting the earth reflect and scatter

199.
200.
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203.

See Foust, supra note 118.
See Positive signs for Europe as ESA goes forward to the Moon, supra note 123.
See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
See Allen, Sandbox Boundaries, supra note 176-179 and accompanying text.
See Allen, supra note 176.
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sunlight, thus interfering with astronomers’ observations)204 by giving
satellites a less reflective coating.205
The mission statements articulated by some big corporate players
in New Space also suggest that these companies are indeed seeking
social legitimacy and support for what is still a new field. The mission
statements of five companies—the big three from the United States
along with a German and a UK company—are discussed below to assess
their efforts to gain social legitimacy. SpaceX’s mission statement is
personally articulated by its founder as follows:206
You want to wake up in the morning and think the future is going to
be great - and that’s what being a spacefaring civilization is all about.
It’s about believing in the future and thinking that the future will be
better than the past. And I can’t think of anything more exciting than
going out there and being among the stars.

Virgin Galactic’s mission statement in 2020 read as follows:207
Our mission, to be the Spaceline for Earth, means we focus on using
space for good while delivering an unparalleled customer
experience.
We recognize that improving access to space is a fundamentally
challenging ambition. We will achieve it only in a spirit of
collaboration and with a recognition that we must continually learn
and can always improve.

The mission statement on the website, in 2022, has been updated as
follows: “We are the world’s first commercial spaceline and our purpose
is to connect people across the globe to the love, wonder, and awe
created by space travel.”208 The updated statement perhaps reflects the
fact that Virgin Galactic has now already ‘accessed space.’209
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Blue Origin’s core mission statement is articulated succinctly in
Latin as graditim ferociter, which is translated as “step by step,
ferociously.”210 The more detailed mission statement is as follows:211
We are not in a race, and there will be many players in this human
endeavor to go to space to benefit Earth. Blue’s part in this journey
is building a road to space with our reusable launch vehicles, so our
children can build the future. We will go about this step by step
because it is an illusion that skipping steps gets us there faster. Slow
is smooth, and smooth is fast.

UK company, OneWeb, has the following message on its website:
OneWeb exists to raise the barriers to connectivity that are holding
economies and communities back.
A digital divide persists, with three billion people around the world
denied access to reliable terrestrial infrastructure. Going digital is a
stepchange that divides many more, on the basis of affordability,
speed, reliability, and digital literacy. Rural or hard to reach
communities especially cannot access the broadband connectivity
(min 25Mbps) that others rely on for interactive, simultaneous
communications at work, at school, for health, or for home.

Even though this is not labelled as a mission statement, it is clearly on
the same lines as the mission statements of the other companies
discussed above.
Although a mission statement is not legally binding, it tells us about
the company’s business, future goals, and its approach to achieving those
goals.212 Such mission statements, or “mission-purpose” statements as
Professors David Kershaw and Edmund Schuster term them, offer
companies a means to bond with their stakeholders, particularly
customers.213 Sometimes the statement can offer customers a “shared
ethical and identity-forming” purpose.214 This is particularly the case
with new technologies, such as fintech or even social media companies
like Facebook and Twitter at a time when those ideas were new.
Companies in the New Space sector are not only offering customers the
dream of new technology; they are also offering them a sense of
210. BLUE ORIGIN, https://www.blueorigin.com/our-mission (last visited Dec. 15, 2020).
211. Id.
212. Graham Kenny, Your Company’s Purpose Is Not Its Vision, Mission, or Values,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 3, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/09/your-companys-purpose-is-not-itsvision-mission-or-values; Mission and Vision Statements, BAIN & CO. (Apr. 2, 2018),
https://www.bain.com/insights/management-tools-mission-and-vision-statements/.
213. David Kershaw & Edmund Schuster, The Purposive Transformation of Corporate
Law 2 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 616/2021, 2021),
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/kershawschusterfinal.pdf.
214. Id. at 13.
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adventure and possibility. This is obvious from all five mission
statements discussed above but particularly so with SpaceX because its
sole message is that it is going to do something special (make us a
spacefaring civilization).215 Virgin Galactic wants to make it clear that
it wants to use space “for good”216 and Blue Origin indirectly echoes this
sentiment when it says its activities in space should “benefit earth” and
that it will go about its goals in a “step by step” manner and will not skip
steps.217
It would seem that Allen’s observations about fintech companies
seeking social legitimacy are also true in New Space. In fact, New Space
companies may be going beyond bonding with customers. Their talk of
responsible space and future generations in the mission statements seem
to also be aimed at the broader policy discourse on the sustainable use
of space. Thus, these companies are seeking out customers with the
promise of an exciting journey on the one hand, while also noting that it
will be for “the good” and to “benefit earth” on the other hand. In other
words, they are promising Responsible Space, thus speaking to the
criticism leveled against corporate activity in space and suggesting that
the criticism is unwarranted.
Regulatory sandboxes and sandbox bridges would help regulators
promote research that helps make outer space activity more sustainable
while also allowing them to slowly incorporate minimum standards into
bilateral agreements, MoUs, and consequently domestic regulations.
The existence of multilateral agreements setting out broad principles,
complemented by regulatory sandboxes and sandbox bridges, would
further incentivize and guide companies in the New Space sector to
anticipate regulations as per the principles set out and act responsibly.
As Professor Armour explains, firms engaging in such anticipatory
compliance (or “forward compliance” as he calls it) “will stand a far
better chance of weathering any subsequent reputational storm, as the
internal communications that emerge will show the firm grappling
proactively with the problem rather than seeking to bury it.”218
Finally, the collaboration between countries via sandbox bridges
will also increase cross-border investments, which could provide
incentives for countries to restrict themselves to peaceful uses of outer
space. The current controversies relating to the Moon Agreement and
the Artemis Accords suggest that an international treaty for the New
215. SPACEX, supra note 206.
216. VIRGIN GALACTIC, supra note 207.
217. BLUE ORIGIN, supra note 210.
218. John Armour, The Case for ‘Forward Compliance’, 34 BRITISH ACAD. REV.,
Autumn 2018, at 19.
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Space sector is not likely in the near future. Even if a new international
treaty is agreed upon, it would only set out very broad principles and it
would then be left up to domestic laws to regulate the rapidly evolving
sector. The model proposed in this Article, inspired by the regulation of
the fintech sector, would be most suitable.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that regulatory sandboxes, as used in
fintech, would be suitable and safe for the current needs of New Space.
Further, it has argued that regulatory sandbox bridges between different
jurisdictions can help build international consensus on several issues,
including sustainability standards. Such a model could eventually lead
to a multi-state, and possibly even international, monitoring system that
deploys regtech to monitor and enforce corporate space activity. The
proposed model can be adapted to each jurisdiction’s needs based on
specific factors identified in the Article. Ultimately, the proposals
outlined in this Article are not meant to supplant international law, but
rather to complement and perhaps even help shape future international
law efforts.

